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NOTE
RESTORATION OF PROPERTY: ILLUSORY
BARRIER TO INTERSPOUSAL GIFTS
INTRODUCTION
When property is divided between spouses upon divorce in
Kentucky, each item is assumed to be marital property unless
it is, among other things, a gift.' Marital property is divided
between the spouses, whereas each spouse keeps property ac-
quired by gift.2 Interspousal gifts, however, have been treated
differently from other gifts. Prior to the enactment of the pres-
ent Kentucky divorce act, Kentucky courts restored to each
donor-spouse gifts which had been conveyed to the other
spouse in "consideration of the marriage," in order "to restore
the parties, propertywise, into the position they would have
had except for the marriage." 3 Recent Kentucky cases imply
that the new divorce statute perpetuates this restoration con-
cept.' Whether it truly does is a question that deserves exami-
nation.
In order to decide whether interspousal gifts are, or should
be, "gifts" for the purpose of the marital property exception,
it is first necessary to ask whether interspousal gifts are valid
in Kentucky.5 If interspousal gifts are valid, then a second
question arises: Is restoration, which would obliterate these
gifts, currently a viable concept?' If not, then interspousal gifts
Ky. REv. STAT. § 403.190(2)(a), (3) (Supp. 1978) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
I Id. at (1), (2)(a).
R. PErauLi, KENTUCKY FAMIy LAw § 24.6 at 358-59, 360 (1969); Stratton v.
Stratton, 211 S.W.2d 685, 686 (Ky. 1948) (husband "gratuitously bestowed" property
on wife and thus entitled to restoration); Walter v. Moore, 249 S.W. 1041, 1042 (Ky.
1923) (diamond ring given "in consideration of marriage" and restored to husband).
See Colley v. Colley, 460 S.W.2d 821, 825 (Ky. 1970) ("The restoration of property
statute was simply designed and expressed to require that each spouse return gifts that
were received from the other spouse or his family during marriage. Gifts made because
of the existence of marriage are restorable."). This requirement was based on KRS §§
403.060, .065 (repealed in 1972).
Kidwell v. Mason, 564 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1978); Ping v. Denton, 562 S.W.2d 314
(Ky. 1978). For a discussion of these cases, see text at notes 42-57 infra.
' See text accompanying notes 8-35 infra for a discussion of the validity of gifts.
I See text accompanying notes 35-183 infra for a discussion of the viability of the
restoration concept.
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should be treated as all other gifts are treated under Ken-
tucky's division of property statute and should be retained by
the donee-spouse.7
I. THE VALIDITY OF INTERSPousAL Gm'Ts IN KENTUCKY
The marital property "gift" exception can include inter-
spousal gifts only if such gifts are valid in Kentucky. Kentucky
courts have long recognized that a husband may make a gift
to his wife' and that a wife may make a gift to her husband.9
These views are in accord with those of other American courts
- federal and state.10 Interspousal gifts can result either from
a spouse bringing property into the marriage and giving it to
the other spouse" or from property being acquired during the
marriage in one spouse's name and then conveyed to the other
spouse.'2 The latter form of interspousal gift was more likely to
give rise to a finding of a gift under former Kentucky divorce
law than it is today. Under modem Kentucky divorce law,
property acquired during the marriage is presumed to be mari-
tal property'3 and thus "owned" by both spouses, regardless of
how title to that property is held. Prior to the enactment of
Kentucky's modern divorce statute, however, property ac-
quired during marriage was not marital property and thus
could be held to be the subject of an interspousal gift.
Petrilli is in accord with this view. R. PurmR , KNiUCKY FAMILY LAw § 24.6 at
34 (Supp. 1977).
' United States Trust Co. v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 281 S.W. 530 (Ky.
1926); Rudd v. Rudd, 214 S.W. 791 (Ky. 1919); Nall v. Miller, 25 S.W. 1106 (Ky. 1894);
Gable v. Gable's Adm'r, 12 Ky. L. Rep. 358 (Super. 1890); Jackson v. Reynolds, 7 Ky.
L. Rep. 98 (Super. 1885); Haskell v. Bakewell, 49 Ky. (10 B. Mon.) 206 (1849).
Jent's Ex'rs v. Dodson, 294 S.W. 1052 (Ky. 1927); Barbee v. Harvey, 283 S.W.
442 (Ky. 1926); Buckel v. Smith's Adm'r, 82 S.W. 235 (Ky. 1904); Long v. Beard, 48
S.W. 158 (Ky. 1898); Broaddus' Ex'rs v. Broaddus, 27 S.W. 989 (Ky. 1894); Orr's
Adm'r v. Orr's Ex'r, 10 S.W. 640 (Ky. 1889); Latimer v. Glenn, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 535
(1866); Scarborough v. Watkins, 48 Ky. (9 B. Mon.) 540 (1849).
'1 See, e.g., Carter v. United States ex rel. Director of Internal Revenue, 399 F.2d
340 (5th Cir. 1968) (both husband and wife as donor); Barrett v. Commissioner, 185
F.2d 150 (1st Cir. 1950) (husband to wife); Collins v. Streitz, 95 F.2d 430 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 305 U.S. 608 (1938) (wife to husband); Young v. Gnichtel, 28 F.2d 789
(D.N.J. 1928) (wife to husband); In re Smith, 291 F. 587 (N.D.N.Y. 1923) (husband
to wife).
" See, e.g., Quin v. Quin, 259 S.W.2d 23 (Ky. 1953).
12 See, e.g., Gable v. Gable's Adm'r, 12 Ky. L. Rep. 358 (Super. 1890).
'= KRS § 403.190 (3) (Supp. 1978): "All property acquired by either spouse after
the marriage ... is presumed to be marital property ......
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Traditionally, gifts between spouses must meet the usual
property law requirements to be valid. In a 1910 case, Ken-
tucky's highest court stated that for an effective interspousal
gift to exist, "there must be a gratuitous and absolute transfer
of the property from the donor to the donee, taking effect im-
mediately, and fully executed by a delivery of the property by
the donor and acceptance thereof by the donee."" In short,
there must be intent to make a present gift, delivery by the
donor, and acceptance by the donee.'5 The Court has invalida-
ted interspousal gifts if there was no evidence of donative in-
tent" or of intent to make a present gift."
The Court has made interspousal gift law consistent with
property law in more particular aspects. For example, in the
absence of actual physical delivery, the Court found construc-
tive delivery to exist when a husband wrote his wife's name on
an envelope containing bonds and put it in her safety deposit
box.'8 Additionally, gifts causa mortis have been declared to
exist when the donor-spouse made the gift in contemplation of
death." As a rule, then, both broad and narrow principles gov-
erning gifts in property law have influenced the development
of interspousal gift law in Kentucky.
The Court has often found that the intent necessary for a
valid gift has been negated by undue influence upon the donor-
spouse. As stated by Justice Story, "'[C]ourts of equity exam-
ine every such transaction between husband and wife with an
anxious watchfulness and caution and dread of undue influ-
ence.' "20 Despite Justice Story's concern, however, Kentucky
"Foxworthy v. Adams, 124 S.W. 381, 383 (Ky. 1910).
, For two cases in which all three requirements were satisfied, see Quin v. Quin,
259 S.W.2d 23 (Ky. 1953), and Leitner's Adm'r v. Grauman, 177 S.W.2d 903 (Ky.
1944).
1, Morguelan v. Lynch, 244 S.W.2d 433 (Ky. 1951); Roberts v. Farley, 161 S.W.2d
930 (Ky. 1942). For a case in which the Court struck down a conveyance because the
transfer was not gratuitous and therefore lacked donative intent, see Phillips v. Phil--
lips, 210 S.W.2d 756 (Ky. 1948).
" Hays v. Hays' Adm'r, 290 S.W.2d 795 (Ky. 1956).
" Fitzpatrick's Adm'r v. Citizens' Bank & Trust Co., 21 S.W.2d 254 (Ky. 1929).
s Scherzinger v. Scherzinger, 132 S.W.2d 537 (Ky. 1939); Broaddus' Ex'rs v.
Broaddus, 27 S.W. 989 (Ky. 1894).
23 Golding v. Golding, 82 Ky. 51, 59 (1884) (quoting STORY, 2 EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE § 1,395). See also Scarborough v. Watkins, 48 Ky. (9 B. Mon.) 540
(1849).
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courts recognized that it is natural for husbands and wives to
make gratuitous conveyances to each other - that, indeed,
such gifts are the rule and not the exception. As a result, the
courts developed a rule of evidence that provided for a pre-
sumption of intent to make a gift if one spouse conveyed prop-
erty to the other.21
The presumption was rebuttable2 because the Court rec-
ognized "the relation of confidence existing between husband
and wife. Trust and affection and unity of interest continue to
afford exceptional opportunities for one to have great influence
over the other. '2 3 In Golding v. Golding,2' the Court ordered a
husband to return a gift which his wife had given him because
the conveyance had been made when the wife "was. . . many
miles distant from those interested in advising her and protect-
ing her estate. ' 25 The Court found it significant that the wife
was "affectionate and loving. . . while the husband was a man
of indomitable will," and that the husband's treatment of his
wife "was not like that of other husbands to their wives who
boarded at the same house. ' 26 At times the feared influence
was not present. For example, a wife with proven business
21 See, e.g., United States Trust Co. v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 281 S.W.
530 (Ky. 1926); Stratton v. Wilson, 185 S.W. 522 (Ky. 1916); Adams v. Button, 161
S.W. 1100 (Ky. 1914); Long v. Beard, 48 S.W. 158 (Ky. 1898); Broaddus' Ex'rs v.
Broaddus, 27 S.W. 989 (Ky. 1894); Nall v. Miller, 25 S.W. 1106 (Ky. 1894).
22 United States Trust Co. v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 281 S.W. 530 (Ky.
1926).
' Buckel v. Smith's Adm'r, 82 S.W. 235, 236 (Ky. 1904).
24 82 Ky. 51 (1884).
1 Id. at 55.
" Id. at 56. Notably, Golding was a divorce case; others cited in this section
involved post-death claims of gifts. If the courts had strictly interpreted the concept
of restoration that prevailed from the 1870's until 1970, see text accompanying notes
103-29 infra, there should have been no question that interspousal gifts were conveyed
without "valuable consideration" and therefore invalid in the divorce context. The fact
that some of these gifts were upheld indicates the confusion that existed regarding the
concepts of restoration and property division. See text accompanying notes 130-48
infra. As it was, the courts ignored the restoration concept in the gift situation and
looked toward the validity of the gift.
Regarding both divorce and post-death gifts, the courts discussed fault and virtue
in their consideration of the validity of the gifts. See, e.g., Leitner's Adm'r v. Grauman,
177 S.W.2d 903, 904 (Ky. 1944) (gift to wife upheld; "the wife was the dominating
influence in the business life . . . . [S]he at all times held the purse strings."); Pare
v. Renfro, 198 S.W. 553, 554 (Ky. 1917) (gift to wife upheld; the wife was bright and
husband "had confidence in her ability as a financial manager;. . . his confidence was
not misplaced."). Such discussion was related to the question of intent to make a gift.
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acumen was seen as not having been dominated by her hus-
band's will.27
In recent years, the Court has not used this rebuttable
presumption for interspousal gifts. 28 Rather, the spouse who
claims to have received a gift must prove that the traditional
elements of a gift - intent to make a present gift, transfer, and
acceptance - were present. 9 Although concern for meek
spouses remains, traditional notions of property law generally
govern interspousal gifts.
These principles have been dispositive, however, only be-
tween the spouses. "It is the established rule in this state that
transactions between husband and wife will be closely scruti-
nized when such claims are prejudicial to or in conflict with the
claims of creditors."3 Before a rule was codified, Kentucky's
highest court frequently struck down husband-wife gifts as
fraudulent conveyances. Since 1894, a statute has required
that, to be valid as to third persons, an interspousal gift must
be in writing, acknowledged, and recorded. 2 This statutory
requirement is thoroughly justifiable, since "a change of pos-
" Broaddus' Ex'rs v. Broaddus, 27 S.W. 989 (Ky. 1894).
21 See, e.g., Preston v. Preston's Adm'x, 53 S.W.2d 957 (Ky. 1932); Jent's Ex'rs v.
Dodson, 294 S.W. 1052 (Ky. 1927). An exception is Bohannon v. Bohannon, 249 S.W.2d
544, 545 (Ky. 1952), in which the husband, viewed as bearing fault in a divorce case,
was presumed to have given his wife a gift "because of the husband's legal duty to
maintain his wife." As will be observed, prior to Kentucky's present no-fault divorce
law, fault frequently occasioned manipulation of rules of law in divorce cases.
2 Knox v. Trimble, 324 S.W.2d 130 (Ky. 1959). Property acquired from persons
other than spouses is presumed to be marital property and must be proved to be a gift
by clear and convincing evidence. Browning v. Browning, 551 S.W.2d 823, 825 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1977).
N Clausen v. First Nat'l Bank, 126 S.W.2d 1065, 1067 (Ky. 1939).
1, See, e.g., Latimer v. Glenn, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 535, 547 (1866) ("[W]hen marriage
alone is the consideration, and the property settled after marriage is out of the hus-
band's estate, and to the detriment of his creditors, these have been generally held
fraudulent and void both in England and America."); Haskell v. Bakewell, 49 Ky. (10
B. Mon.) 206, 208-09 (1850) ("One, who is not in debt, may convey to his wife. . . a
portion of his estate, and such conveyance cannot be held as fraudulent, unless it was
made with the intention of becoming indebted, and the object of the deed was to
prevent the subjection of the property to the payment of such future debts."); Jackson
v. Reynolds, 7 Ky. L. Rep. 98, 98 (Super. 1885) ("A voluntary gift by the husband to
the wife is good against him and his representatives, and while not valid against
existing creditors it is good against subsequent creditors, unless made with a fraudu-
lent intent.").
- KRS § 404.020(2) (Supp. 1978) (originally enacted in 1894 Ky. Acts, ch. 76, §
33 at 177).
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session between husband and wife cannot be detected by the
naked eye of a prospective creditor. Unless a gift between
spouses is recorded, outsiders are apt to extend further credit
in reliance upon the supposition that the donor still has title."'
This recordation statute is perhaps the best evidence that
interspousal gifts can be made at all in Kentucky. A gift may
be valid between husband and wife and invalid as to a third
party34 if the spouses failed to satisfy the statutory require-
ment.3 5 Because they are valid between spouses, interspousal
gifts should be treated as gifts for the "gift" exception from
marital property upon dissolution of marriage.
I1. RESTORATION OF PROPERTY IN KENTUCKY
The preceding section reveals that a Kentucky court may
refuse to recognize a gift as valid between a husband and wife
if any of the basic requirements for a gift are not present. For-
merly, a separate theory under which either spouse could at-
tack a gift upon divorce rested in Kentucky's restoration stat-
ute.38 "Restoration" represents the idea that both spouses
should be restored the property they would have had but for
the marriage.3 7 That is, all property that was transferred solely
because of the marriage is restored to the donor. Although no
restoration language is contained in the current divorce stat-
ute, the Kentucky Supreme Court has implied that the restora-
tion concept endures. Yet, in light of the origin of the restora-
tion concept and its development within Kentucky, restoration
may have no role to play in modern divorce law.
A. Current Law
Nowhere in current Kentucky divorce law is the word
R. Hutchcraft, Unrecorded Transactions Between Husband and Wife, 5 KY.
L.J. (No. 2) 32, 35-(1916).
31 Heirs of the husband do not qualify as "third parties" for the purpose of the
recordation statute. McWethy's Adm'x v. McCright, 133 S.W. 1001 (Ky. 1911).
5 McCollum v. Parsons, 266 S.W. 43 (Ky. 1924). See also Thomson v. Dennis'
Ex'x, 138 S.W.2d 490 (Ky. 1940). For further interpretations of the statute, see Hager
v. Coleman, 208 S.W.2d 518 (Ky. 1948); Farmers Bank v. Ashcraft's Adm'r, 137
S.W.2d.422 (Ky. 1940); Cartwright v. Ennis, 284 S.W. 87 (Ky. 1926); R. Hutchcraft,
supra note 33.
KRS §§ 403.060, .065 (Supp. 1978). See note 39 and accompanying text infra
for the wording of these provisions.
' See text accompanying notes 156-59 infra for a discussion of this theory.
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"restoration" present. Kentucky's statute for disposition of
property upon divorce, KRS § 403.190, reads:
(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of the marriage. .. , the
court shall assign each spouse's property to him. It shall also
divide the marital property ....
(2) For the purpose of this chapter, 'marital property'
means all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to
the marriage except:
(a) Property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or de-
scent;
(3) All property acquired by either spouse after the mar-
riage and before a decree of legal separation is presumed to
be marital property, regardless of whether title is held indi-
vidually or by the spouses in some form of coownership ....
The presumption of marital property is overcome by a show-
ing that the property Vas acquired by a method listed in
subsection (2) of this section."
In contrast, the now-extinct Kentucky restoration statute spe-
cifically required restoration of certain property upon a decree
of divorce:
Upon final judgment of divorce from the bonds of matri-
mony, each party shall be restored all the property, not dis-
posed of at the beginning of the action, that he or she ob-
tained from or through the other before or during the mar-
riage and in consideration of the marriage. 9
KRS § 403.190 (Supp. 1978).
, KRS § 403.060(2) (repealed 1972). This statute was the general authority pro-
viding for disposition of property upon divorce. Another statute outlined the
"proceedings" for restoration:
Every judgment for a divorce from the bond of matrimony shall contain an
order restoring any property not disposed of at the commencement of the
action, which either party may have obtained, directly or indirectly, from or
through the other, during marriage, in consideration or by reason thereof;
and any property so obtained, without valuable consideration, shall be
deemed to have been obtained by reason of marriage.
KRS § 403.065 (repealed 1972). The function of this restoration order (§ 403.065), as
interpreted by Kentucky's highest court, was only "to regulate the mode of enforcing
the right of restoration, and not to establish or define such right." Phillips v. Phillips,
72 Ky. (9 Bush) 183, 186 (1872). The order was meant to be a formality, and was not
1978-791
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By its terms, then, the present statute conspicuously omits the
word "restoration."
In spite of this omission, the restoration concept may have
survived the repeal of the restoration statute. The first hint was
in Farmer v. Farmer,4" when Kentucky's highest court, subse-
quent to the statutory change, used the word "restoration."
That case held that property which a wife acquired "by gift or
inheritance from her parents and grandmother and which she
invested in the residence must be restored to her. To do this,
it should be declared that she owns an interest in that residence
in proportion to that investment.""1 Arguably the case can be
confined to its facts and applied only to gifts from one spouse's
family to that spouse, not to interspousal gifts. The Court could
simply have said that such gifts fit into the exemption of KRS
§ 403.190(2) (a) and not have implied that the restoration con-
cept was being utilized. The implication of Farmer, however,
is that the restoration notion endures.
More recently, the Kentucky Court of Appeals has held
that the concept of restoration is included in the word "assign"
as used in KRS § 403.190.42 In Denton v. Travelers Insurance
meant to adjudicate the rights of either spouse in any specific property. Bennett v.
Bennett, 26 S.W. 392 (Ky. 1894); Williams v. Gooch, 60 Ky. (3 Met.) 442 (1861).
The importance of the restoration order has been well established. Its presence was
mandatory, not optional. Ball v. Ball, 317 S.W.2d 362 (Ky. 1958); Hanks v. Hanks,
138 S.W.2d 362 (Ky. 1940). A restoration order was required even if restoration was
not requested in the pleadings. Traughber v. Traughber, 434 S.W.2d 643 (Ky. 1968);
Fifer v. Fifer, 205 S.W.2d 479 (Ky. 1947); Williams v. Gooch, 60 Ky. (3 Met.) 442
(1861). For rare exceptions to this rule, see Ficke v. Prudential Ins. Co., 202 S.W.2d
429 (Ky. 1947); Flimin v. Flimin's Adm'x, 64 S.W.2d 165 (Ky. 1933). If a divorce decree
did not provide for restoration of property, the slighted spouse was entitled to bring a
later action for restoration. Mills v. Epperson, 259 S.W.2d 687 (Ky. 1953). A later
action could be brought if as much time as two years had elapsed and the spouse
claiming a right to restoration had failed to appear in the original action. Dague v.
Dague, 411 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. 1967). The right to restoration has even been held to
survive the death of the spouse claiming it. Henderson v. Baker, 362 S.W.2d 730 (Ky.
1962). Plainly, the Court considered the restoration order a vital element in divorce
cases.
40 506 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1974).
,1 Id. at 111 (emphasis added). It should be noted that Farmer involved gifts from
the wife's family rather than gifts directly from the wife to the husband. Restoration
has traditionally applied to such situations. In fact, "the restoration statute was simply
designed and expressed to require that each spouse retain gifts that were received from
the other spouse or his family during marriage." Colley v. Colley, 460 S.W.2d 821, 825
(Ky. 1970) (emphasis added).
"1 KRS § 403.190(1) provides: "In a proceeding for dissolution of the marriage...
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Co.,43 an insurance company had paid the proceeds of a policy
to decedent's ex-wife because she was the named beneficiary.
Decedent's sister, administratrix of her brother's estate, sued
the insurance company for the proceeds and the company filed
a third-party action against the ex-wife for indemnity. Prior
Kentucky case law held "that the interest of one spouse as the
beneficiary of insurance on the life of the other is divested by
divorce . . . . [Tihe rationale for such a result has been that
it was compelled by the restoration statutes, KRS 403.060 and
403.065."l The issue in Denton was whether repeal of the resto-
ration law and enactment of the new divorce law changed the
long-held view. With regard to the language "the court shall
assign each spouse's property to him . ,-4 the court of ap-
peals held:
We find no meaningful change in the effect of the new law
.... The word 'assign' is clearly more inclusive than the
word 'restore' as used in the former statutes. As set out in
KRS 403.190, 'assign' would include both restoration of the
individual property of eAch spouse and a division of the prop-
erties as described therein which constitute marital prop-
erty.4
6
The major failing of Denton is that broad language was
used without due consideration for the ramifications of the
holding." In order to determine whether the concept of restora-
the court shall assign each spouse's property to him."
"3 555 S.W.2d 825 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, sub nom. Ping
v. Denton, 562 S.W.2d 314 (Ky. 1978).
"1 Id. at 827. For the text of the two statutes, see note 39 and accompanying text
supra.
See text accompanying note 38 supra for the full text of this statute.
" 555 S.W.2d at 827-28 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
The court of appeals reiterated its position that restoration persists today by its
holding in Kentucky Central Life Ins. Co. v. Willett, 557 S.W.2d 222 (Ky. Ct. App.
1977), a case with facts similar to those in Denton. The court barred a spouse's recovery
as a designated beneficiary of a life insurance policy on a former spouse's life. The court
noted the absence of the word "restore" from the present statute but concluded:
Neither do we find that the change from the word 'restore' to the word
'assign' has the effect of changing the well-accepted rule that one spouse's
interest as beneficiary of the insurance on the life of the other spouse is
terminated by their divorce. We do not assign any significance to whatever
slight variation there may be in the meaning of these two words.
Id. at 223.
"1 A second deficiency is also apparent in Denton. The court misread the current
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tion has any place in modern divorce law,4" the court should
have carefully studied the history of restoration in Kentucky
and perhaps outside Kentucky. If the notion has roots in some
theory which is no longer valid, it does not belong in current
cases. The Court did not allude, however, to any such examina-
tion or interpretation of the prior law.
On appeal, in Ping v. Denton,4" the Kentucky Supreme
Court reversed the court of appeals on this issue: "Although
KRS 403.190 replaced KRS 403.060 and 403.065, it does not
necessarily follow that it was intended to, nor does it have the
same effect on the respective rights of the parties as did KRS
403.060 and 403.065." 5 The Court went on to hold that restora-
tion is not appropriate in the Denton fact situation.-"
At first glance, this case seems to indicate that with the
repeal of KRS § § 403.060 and 403.065, restoration died as well.
Yet, the bulk of the Court's opinion dealt with the nature of
the life insurance policy. The Court developed the idea that at
the time of the divorce the owner of the property was the hus-
band, not the beneficiary.
statute. "Assign" does not include the step of dividing marital property, contrary to
the language from the case which is quoted above. Under the precise language of the
statute, courts are instructed to assign individual property first, then to divide marital
property. The two steps are distinctly separate. Had the court explored the history of
the restoration statute, it would have discovered that these two steps were confused
under former divorce law, only to be'painstakingly separated by the Kentucky Su-
preme Court and subsequently by the legislature in the new statute. See Colley v.
Colley, 460 S.W.2d 821 (Ky. 1970), for a discussion of both the prior confusion and the
separation of these steps. Arguably the Court's misreading was minor, or at best
unintentional. If intentional, it may represent a lapse into the habit of pre-Colley
analysis of property division. Colley corrected years of mistakes which should not recur
today.
1 The new Kentucky divorce law represents both a removal of the restoration
statute and a change to no-fault divorce. No-fault divorce and its bases are outside
the coverage of this Note. For a discussion of no-fault divorce, see M. WHEun, No-
FAULT DIVORCE (1974). On the Kentucky law, see Note, Kentucky's New Dissolution
of Marriage Law, 61 Ky. L.J. 980 (1973).
562 S.W.2d 314 (Ky. 1978).
" Id. at 316.
5 Id. Restoration may still endure as a factor in some insurance cases. In Shell-
man v. Independence Life & Accident Ins. Co., 523 S.W.2d 221 (Ky. 1975), the Court
applied the restoration statute, notwithstanding its repeal, because that law had been
in effect when the Shellmans were divorced. The Court cites Shellman in Ping v.
Denton. Although there will be a cutoff point at which these carryover cases will cease,
restoration nonetheless will persist in some insurance situations.
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The policy of insurance is what is known as a straight-
life policy. The premiums on the policy were paid by James'
employer as a fringe benefit. It accumulates no cash surren-
der value. In other words, its monetary value was at the time
of the death of the insured, not at the time of the dissolution
of the marriage.
. . 'The group insurance policy was the property of the
deceased at all times, before and after the divorce. The bene-
ficiary did not acquire any property in the policy during the
marriage or in consideration of the marriage.'52
The Court appeared to flirt with the idea of abandoning the
restoration concept, yet devoted most of its opinion to showing
that the concept of restoration would not apply to this particu-
lar fact situation. If the husband owned the property at all
times and the wife, an alleged donee, never owned it, certainly
there would be no need to restore such property to the husband.
Restoration cannot be made when the gift has never been
given.
The Court may have intended to limit its holding to the
narrow group of cases dealing with life insurance policies. Two
indications of this restrictive interpretation are present in Ping.
First, all of the cases which were cited by the Court on this
issue were insurance cases. Further, the Court analyzed the
case on the narrow factual question of ownership rather than
reaching the difficult question of whether restoration should
persist in all cases.
In another context, the Kentucky Supreme Court found
that the new divorce statute altered the right to restoration as
it existed under the old statute. In Kidwell v. Mason,3 the
Supreme Court held that a court has no power to order
"restoration of property subsequent to the entry of a final de-
cree where no reservation of that issue was provided for in the
decree. ' 5 The dispute in Kidwell was about property which
had not been assigned in the divorce decree two years earlier,
but which was held in the joint names of the former spouses.
The Court held that the earlier divorce decree "[had] the
12 562 S.W.2d at 315 (quoting in part the lower court).
3 564 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1978).
1 Id. at 535.
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same effect as if the trial judge had specifically written therein
that [the former spouses] each owned an undivided one-half
interest in and to the subject property."5
The Court did not review the history of restoration in
Kidwell, nor did it categorically reject the current use of resto-
ration. Rather, it appeared once again to base its decision on a
narrow factual context. In quoting from Ping v. Denton, the
Court compared KRS § 403.190 with the old restoration stat-
utes:
'This [new] statute mandates the trial judge to assign
each spouse's property to him. Like other issues of fact, the
interest of James and Iva [Ping] were proper for inquiry and
adjudication. The decree of dissolution of marriage, including
the assignment of property, like other civil judgments be-
came final ten days after its decree. . . . Thus, unlike KRS
403.060 and 403.065, it [the new statute] does not leave open
for subsequent inquiry the rights of either or both that have
not been adjudicated upon the final determination of the
controversy.'56
The Court appeared to decide only that restoration cannot be
ordered under the new statute after a divorce decree becomes
final, although it could have been so ordered under the old
statutes.-7 Still unanswered is the question of whether restora-
tion can be ordered in the original divorce case. Outside the
Kidwell and Ping fact situations, then, the Court has left room
for restoration to survive.
These cases imply that the new statute continues the res-
toration notion, despite the failure of the legislature to have
used the word at all. Surely, it cannot be assumed that the
state legislature ignored the long and checkered history of res-
toration of property or that the omission was unintentional. As
Justice Osborne stated at an earlier point in the history of the
restoration statute:
This court has no right, it has never had a right, to change
or alter so much as one period or one comma in the legislative
act. It is a weakness of our system of government that erro-
neous judicial decisions are enforced once they become final
Id. at 536.
Id. at 535-36 (quoting Ping v. Denton, 562 S.W.2d 314, 317 (Ky. 1978)).
" See note 39 supra for discussion of restoration actions after the divorce decree
has become final.
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the same as proper ones. . . .However, they are not the law;
they will never be the law and a thousand years from now
they will prove nothing but the fact that a court in this day
and age had a right to ignore the plain, simple law and decide
cases out of its bounds. 8
B. Roots of Restoration
In order to determine whether restoration should endure
today, the history of the concept and of the Kentucky restora-
tion statute must be carefully analyzed. The sources and mean-
ing of "restoration" have never been incisively explored in Ken-
tucky. The word "restore" as commonly used, however, con-
notes property being returned to its original owner. 9
"Restoration" should logically be applied at some point in a
marriage at which an original owner is stripped of his rights in
property. Prior to the passage of the married women's property
laws,"0 such a divestiture occurred. In those years, the rites of
marriage made the new husband the owner of what had been
his wife's separate property. He was free to use it and convey
it as he wished. Marriage created in him the full rights of
ownership which had been formerly enjoyed by his new wife. 1
If the couple were granted a divorce, that property, or what
remained of it, would be restored to the wife. 2 Restoration,
then, enabled courts to protect the wife, whose rights had been
divested by virtue of the marriage.
This need for protection was abolished by the married
women's property laws, which decreed that a woman no longer
"Reed v. Reed, 457 S.W.2d 4, 17 (Ky. 1969) (Osborne, J., dissenting).
, The definitions of "restore" include: "to give back"; "to bring back to or put
back into a former or original state"; and "to put again in possession of something."
Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 733 (7th ed. 1967).
" Married women's property acts were passed in Kentucky in 1846, 1868, and-
1894, the last of which is known as the Weissinger Act. Roberts, Property Rights of
Married Women in Kentucky, 11 Ky. L.J. 1, 1 (1922). The Weissinger Act of 1894 "is
generally supposed to have given [a married woman] as full and complete power over
both her personal and real property as those possessed by an unmarried woman. .. "
Id. at 4. Currently, Kentucky's act is codified in KRS § 404.020(1) (Supp. 1978): "A
married woman may acquire and hold property, real and personal, by gift, .. and
may... dispose of her personal property."
" Roberts, supra note 60, at 1-2.
82 Viser v. Bertrand, 16 Ark. 296 (1855); Hinds v. Hinds, 7 Mackey 85 (D.C. 1888);
Kriger v. Day, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 316 (1824); Tewksbury v. Tewksbury, 5 Miss. (4
Howard) 109 (1839); Dillon v. Starin, 63 N.W. 12 (Neb. 1895).
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need surrender her individual property to her husband when
she married. 3 Since the wife no longer lost her property at
marriage, there was no longer a need to restore it to her. In
short, the very notion of restoration should not have survived
the enactment of the married women's property laws.
Cases decided outside Kentucky contain explicit language
regarding the roots of restoration. These cases show that the
common-sense meaning of restoration is the correct one. Cases
from Mississippi64 and Massachusetts" reveal that restoration
was intended "only to authorize the restoration of property to
which the husband acquired title by marriage." 6 In Nebraska,
restoration was held to be inapplicable to a gift from a wife to
her husband. The Nebraska court placed restoration in its pro-
per perspective:.
This act was passed prior to the enactment of the mar-
ried woman's act, and it ... referred to ... the property
rights of a husband as they existed at common law, and [its]
object was to restore the wife to her property rights on disso-
lution of marriage, and prevent the husband retaining the
personal property and possession of the real estate there-
after. 7
Women's disabilities had created a need for restoration laws.
When the married women's laws removed those disabilities,
the need for restoration was removed."
Kentucky case law does not expressly reveal the origins of
the restoration concept in Kentucky. No pure restoration stat-
ute existed until 1850.9 The precursor of the 1850 statute,
3 Roberts, supra note 60, at 4.
" Tewksbury v. Tewksbury, 5 Miss. (4 Howard) 109 (1939).
Phillips v. Culliton, 26 N.E. 137 (Mass. 1891).
,Id. at 137. See also Dean v. Richmond, 5 Pick. 461 (Mass. 1828) (language
showing that restoration applied only to wives).
v Dillon v. Starin, 63 N.W. 12, 14 (Neb. 1895).
" See Hinds v. Hinds, 7 Mackey 85 (D.C. 1888).
" 1850 Ky. Acts, ch. 617, art. Il, § 6 at 219 (effective 1852). The wording of the
statute was virtually identical to the modem statute, KRS § 403.060(2) (see text at
note 39 supra for the modem statute):
Upon final decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony, the parties shall
be restored such property, not disposed of at the commencement of suit, as
either obtained from or through the other before or during the marriage, in
consideration or by reason thereof; and if the wife have not sufficient estate
of her own, she may, on a divorce obtained by her, have such allowance out
of that of her husband as shall be deemed equitable.
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passed in 1808, did not mention restoration.71 Rather, it re-
ferred generally to division of property upon divorce and pro-
vided for discretionary division of property: "[T]he court
pronouncing the decree of divorce shall regulate and order the
division of the estate real and personal, in such a way as to
them shall seem just and right, having due regard to each
party, and the children if any. ... 1
The 1808 statute was the sole forerunner of statutes which
governed restoration, property settlement, and alimony. Since
these concepts were all utilized under the same statute, precise
isolation of the restoration concept under the early act is im-
possible. A reading of the handful of cases which construed the
1808 statute reveals that discussions were in terms of property
division in general, rather than restoration (or any other single
component) in particular. 72 Those cases are somewhat helpful,
This statute, just as KRS § 403.060(2), provided the general authority for restoration.
The parallel provision to KRS § 403.065, the "proceedings" statute, was contained in
the 1854 Kentucky Civil Code of Practice § 462. This Code section was changed to §
425 in the 1876 Kentucky Civil Code of Practice. It was amended sometime between
1872 and 1876. See notes 103-09 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of the
amendment.
11 [Tihe court pronouncing the decree of divorce shall regulate and
order the division of estate real and personal, in such way as to them shall
seem just and right, having due regard to each party and the children if any:
Provided however, that nothing herein contained shall be construed to au-
thorize the court to compel either of the parties to divest himself or herself
of the title to the real estate.
1808 Ky. Acts, ch. 31, § 7 at 38.
7 Id.
" Those cases do disclose the factors which the Court deemed significant to prop-
erty division under the 1808 statute. This law gave the court much leeway; fault was
the first identifiable element which the Kentucky Court of Appeals considered regard-
ing property division. Thornberry v. Thornberry, 14 Ky. (4 Litt.) 251 (1823); Fishli v.
Fishli, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 337 (1822). In both of these cases, the wife was apportioned an
amount of property commensurate to her dower rights. The Court stated in Thornbeny
that "no good reason can be assigned why, if she is compelled to a separation, not by
her own fault, but entirely by the ill conduct of her husband, that [a wife] should
receive less than if he had been taken from her by death." 14 Ky. (4 Litt.) at 253. In
contrast, when the Court found a wife at fault in Wihnore v. Wilmore, 54 Ky. (15 B.
Mon.) 49 (1854), it awarded her more than she had received from the trial court but
less than she would have received through dower.
Other criteria were not specified until Wilmore, which was decided after the 1850
restoration statute was enacted but in which the 1808 property division act was none-
theless held to apply. In that case, the Court pointed out that "in the absence of any
flagrant delinquency," the two main factors to be considered in dividing property
under the 1808 statute were the size of the husband's estate and the source of the
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however, in delineating the early history of restoration in Ken-
tucky.
Specifically, two related points should be made about the
1808 statute. First, despite its failure to mention the concept,
the 1808 statute did prompt restoration. In Wilmore v.
Wilmore,73 partial restoration of property to a wife was ordered.
The wife's father had devised slaves to her husband. Her hus-
band, however, had already given some of the slaves to his
children and grandchildren. The Court held that because a
husband had title to his wife's property absolutely as a result
of the marriage and because the husband was legally entitled
to do with that property as he wished," absolute restoration
was not required. 75 However, the wife was granted restoration
of those devised slaves which were still in her husband's posses-
sion.
Second, the cases imply that the early development of
restoration in Kentucky was linked to the inability of married
women to hold and transfer property. The Wilmore Court did
not ignore the fact that if a nineteenth-century married
woman's family wanted to give her some property, they were
forced either to give the property to the husband or to convey
it in trust to a third party.76 Accordingly, the Court emphasized
property. In Wilmore, the husband had received the contested property via the will of
his wife's father, in consideration of marriage. Id. at 50. Other factors which the Court
deemed important were "the great respectability of the parties; their advanced age;
the number of children on each side (though there are none by this marriage); the
associations of the wife, her infirmities, consequent upon her age and laborious indus-
try, and her general good character and conduct, irreproachable, unless on account of
her leaving her husband in this instance, which, though upon the proof, it was not
deemed justifiable by the chancellor who decreed the divorce, was doubtless so deemed
by herself." Id. at 62. In addition to fault, then, factors which the Court declared to
be important considerations under the 1808 property division law were children (speci-
fied by the law itself), extent of property, source of the property, and the situations of
the parties in terms of age, health, and reputation.
7 64 Ky. (15 B. Mon.) 49 (1854).
" This result followed from the married women's property acts. See note 60 and
accompanying text supra for a discussion of the effect of these acts.
,54 Ky. (15 B. Mon.) at 49.
7, In Wilmore, the property was given to the husband. For an example of the use
of a trustee in husband-wife conveyances, see Thomas v. Harkness, 76 Ky. (13 Bush)
23, 27 (1877), in which the Court stated that a married woman could not hold property
in her own name, "but she may be entitled to its beneficial use. This however, can
only be secured to her when the title is held for her by a trustee." Similar devices for
husband-wife conveyances were used in Latimer v. Glenn, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 535 (1866),
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that a major factor in property division in that case was the fact
that the husband had received the slaves via the will of his
wife's father, in consideration of marriage. 7 The Court's ex-
plicit awareness of the inferior position of married women, cou-
pled with their restoration order, are the best documentation
that the early concept of restoration in Kentucky represented
an attempt to divest a husband of that property which he had
received solely because of the marriage. Restoration was the
technique used to return the property to its rightful owner.
C. Restoration after the 1850 Statute
1. Four Basic Prerequisites
The restoration statute adopted in 1850 was, for the most
part, the one in effect until 1972.78 It listed four prerequisites
for restoration: (1) "final decree of divorce," (2) property "not
disposed of at the commencement of suit," (3) property which
one spouse "obtained from or through the other," and (4) prop-
erty acquired "before or during the marriage, in consideration
or by reason thereof."79 The plain meaning of the statute is that
it did not apply if any one of these requirements was absent, 8
and Haskell v. Bakewell, 49 Ky. (10 B. Mon.) 206 (1850).
The need for such contrivances was obviated by the passage of the married
women's property acts. See also Roberts, supra note 60 and accompanying text.
54 Ky. (15 B. Mon.) at 50.
T, Compare 1850 Ky. Acts, ch. 617, art. I, § 6 at 219 (reprinted in note 69 supra)
with KRS § 403.060(2) (repealed 1972, reprinted at text accompanying note 39, supra).
7, 1850 Ky. Acts, ch. 617, art. III, § 6 at 219. See note 69 supra for the text of this
statute.
" Outside the area which is clearly defined by the language of the statute, the
Court has used its discretion to determine the scope of restoration. Property has been
held not restorable if it no longer existed. Scrivner v. Scrivner, 453 S.W.2d 265 (Ky.
1970). Divorce court costs have been deemed nonrestorable. Fyffe v. Fyffe, 375 S.W.2d
407 (Ky. 1964). The Court has penalized a husband who failed to comply with an order
to pay alimony and who did not appear in court by disallowing his claim for restora-
tion. Hughes v. Hughes, 384 S.W.2d 83 (Ky. 1964). While recognizing that the right
to restoration of property could be released, the Court nonetheless declared that it
would closely examine any such release which was supported by minimal considera-
tion. Childress v. Childress, 335 S.W.2d 351 (Ky. 1960). The courts have established
evidentiary guidelines in restoration cases. The party who is seeking restoration bears
the burden of proving that the property is restorable. Potts v. Potts, 142 F.2d 883 (6th
Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 868 (1945); Jackson v. Jackson, 248 S.W.2d 411 (Ky.
1952). In addition, even if some statement of consideration for a conveyance exists, the
party seeking restoration has been permitted to prove that the property is within the
scope of the restoration statutes. Anheier v. De Long, 176 S.W. 195 (Ky. 1915).
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and the case law bears out this literal construction. Kentucky's
highest court held that restoration was not applicable except
in actions for absolute divorce." Anything less could not be a
"final decree of divorce." A restoration order was not required,
or even. pertinent, in an action for legal separation (divorce
from bed and board)." If a judgment of divorce had not been
rendered,1 or if a divorce was denied," no restoration of prop-
erty could be obtained. The spouse who wanted restoration was
not so entitled until the divorce had actually been granted.
Further, if the spouses had already divided the property
before the suit for divorce was commenced, the restoration stat-
utes did not apply. Such property is "disposed of at the com-
mencement of suit." Thus, if a property settlement existed, the
Court would not require restoration of property." A spouse who
had received property via such an agreement was held to be the
unconditional owner of such property; a reconciliation between
the parties did not divest that ownership, even if the owner-
spouse allowed the other spouse to use the property.Y Property
which the parties had failed to include in the settlement could
not be restored; the separation agreement was viewed as final.8
The Court also required that, in order for property to be
restorable, it must have come from or through the spouse who
desired restoration. Property which came from one spouse's
SI E.g., Bailey v. Bailey, 474 S.W.2d 389 (Ky. 1971); Walker v. Walker, 324 S.W.2d
804 (Ky. 1959); Stevens v. Stevens, 231 S.W.2d 49 (Ky. 1950); Murphy v. Murphy,
224 S.W.2d 695 (Ky. 1949); Noel v. Noel, 210 S.W.2d 137 (Ky. 1947); Schultz v. Duitz,
69 S.W.2d 27 (Ky. 1934); Hoagland v. Hoagland, 291 S.W. 1044 (Ky. 1927); Hoffman
v. Hoffman, 226 S.W. 119 (Ky. 1920).
Gentry v. Gentry, 318 S.W.2d 870 (Ky. 1958). For an unusual departure from
this rule, see Keeling v. Keeling, 186 S.W.2d 18 (Ky. 1945).
0 Jones v. Jones, 231 S.W.2d 15 (Ky. 1950).
" LaWarre v. LaWarre, 271 S.W. 660 (Ky. 1925).
u Buckman v. Buckman, 283 S.W. 952 (Ky. 1926).
u Coleman v. Hunt, 258 S.W.2d 484 (Ky. 1953).
17 Gordon v. Gordon, 335 S.W.2d 561 (Ky. 1960).
n Reese v. Greenlee, 214 S.W.2d 262 (Ky. 1948). This case may seem inconsistent
with Kidwell v. Mason, 564 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1978). See notes 53-57 and accompanying
text supra for a discussion of Kidwell. Kidwell indicated that the restoration statute
in effect in Reese left "open for subsequent inquiry the rights of [the spouses] that
have not been adjudicated . . . ." Id. at 535-36. However, even if the restoration
statutes would have left the question open with respect to an adjudication, the issue
in Reese was a property settlement that the parties agreed was "a complete property
settlement." Reese v. Greenlee, 241 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Ky. 1948).
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parents was restored to that party because it came through
him." In contrast, army allotments which were made to a wife
by law were said to be her property and were not restored to
the husband because the allotments did not come "from" or
"through" the husband. 0
Finally, the Court held that property was not restorable if
some consideration existed for the conveyance of the property
other than the marriage. Very early, Kentucky's highest court
interpreted the 1850 statute to require that property must have
been conveyed as a result of the marriage act itself to be restor-
able. " This view prompted an amendment to the statute"
which made more property restorable upon divorce. Since con-
sideration is the most important aspect of restoration, the me-
chanics of this development deserve discussion in some detail.
2. Consideration: The Phillips-Irwin Dichotomy
After the 1850 revision of Kentucky divorce law, the resto-
ration statute and the Civil Code provision required restora-
tion of property obtained "in consideration or by reason" of the
marriage. 3 In Phillips v. Phillips,4 the husband had conveyed
property to a trustee for the use of the wife for life, remainder
in fee simple to their child or children. Consideration was
stated to be one dollar and the love and affection of the wife.
On divorce, the husband sought restoration of the property.
The consideration expressed in the deed was deemed sufficient,
that is, not "by reason" of the marriage, and restoration was
disallowed.
[Tihe term 'consideration' . . . mean[s] the act of mar-
riage, or some agreement or contract touching or relating to
the act of marriage, and the expression 'by reason thereof'
" McCauley v. McCauley, 467 S.W.2d 359 (Ky. 1971); Smith v. Smith, 436
S.W.2d 532 (Ky. 1969).
" Wells v. Wells, 215 S.W.2d 848 (Ky. 1948); Moore v. Moore, 211 S.W.2d 852
(Ky. 1948).
Phillips v. Phillips, 72 Ky. (9 Bush) 183 (1872).
,2 See notes 103-05 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of this amend-
ment.
,1 1850 Ky. Acts, ch. 617, art. Ell, § 6 at 219; 1867 Kentucky Civil Code of Practice
§ 462. For the text of this statute, see note 69 supra; for the text of the Code provision,
see note 103 infra.
" 72 Ky. (9 Bush) 183 (1872).
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[should] be construed to relate to such property as either
party may have obtained from or through the other by opera-
tion of the laws regulating the property rights of husband and
wife.95
The language quoted above makes clear that the Court
thought that only property conveyed by way of some law or
agreement made operative by the marriage itself was restorable
upon divorce. This view was reaffirmed five years after Phillips
when the Court, in disallowing restoration to the husband,
stated that the disputed conveyance had not been "made on
account of an antenuptial agreement or understanding, nor by
way of jointure," nor in the discharge of any obligation, moral
or legal, growing out of the marriage relation. The land was,
therefore, not embraced by the statute .... ""
It is evident from these early cases that one basis for the
Court's conception of restoration was the language of the stat-
ute as it then existed. The Court in Phillips found it
"apparent" from the statutory language:
that the mere fact that property was obtained by one of the
parties from or through the other, before or during the mar-
riage, does not entitle the party from or through whom it was
obtained to have it restored upon final judgment for a di-
vorce. If such had been the legislative intention, the condition
found in each of the two sections [the early versions of KRS
§§ 403.060 and 403.065], that it must have been obtained
'in consideration or by reason of the marriage,' would have
been omitted as superfluous."
The Phillips Court was careful to emphasize that its hold-
ing may have been different if some evidence had existed to
show that the consideration for the conveyance was other than
that recited or if one of the three elements of a valid gift-
intent to make a present gift, delivery, or acceptance-had
not been present." The implication can be drawn that a spouse
" Id. at 187.
"Jointure" is defined as "[a] competent livelihood for the wife in the husband's
property to take effect after his death; it is an estate conveyed or devised to the wife
in lieu of dower and it must be in satisfaction of it." BLACK's LAw Di0rsoNARY 974 (Rev.
4th ed. 1968).
Whaley v. Taylor, 9 Ky. Op. 742, 743 (1877).
"72 Ky. (9 Bush) 183, 186 (1872) (emphasis in original).
"Id. at 187.
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who had actually performed the recited consideration, or who
was the recipient of a completed gift, was less apt to be di-
vested of title via restoration.
The Court respected these rules of contract law and prop-
erty law by limiting restoration, a divorce concept, to those
transfers whose very occurrence hinged upon marriage. Evi-
dently, the Court desired that the notion of restoration should
not easily dispossess a person of property if property law or
contract law had created ownership rights in that person.
A third component of Phillips, in addition to a respect for
the wording of the act and for traditional concepts of contract
and property law, appears to have been the preservation of
harmony between married persons. By only restoring property
that had been conveyed because of marriage, the Court re-
jected the broader view that all property transferred during
marriage should be restored:
If the construction contended for should prevail, we can
conceive of no state of case in which the divorced parties
would not be entitled to a restoration of all property not
disposed of at the commencement of the action which either
had obtained from or through the other before or during the
marriage, unless a money or property consideration had ac-
tually been paid.'"
Four years after Phillips was decided, the Court again in-
dicated that spouses should be allowed to give each other gifts
freely during marriage, without the donee having to relinquish
those gifts upon a divorce:
To decide that a husband who has purchased property
and had it conveyed to his wife, may recover it when she
obtains a divorce from him on the ground of cruel treatment,
would be to establish a precedent dangerous in the extreme
to the peace of families, and detrimental to the best of inter-
ests of society.'
The Court apparently did not want to encourage spouses
to be so wary of deprivation through restoration that they
would feel compelled to give consideration in return for inter-
spousal gifts made during a viable marriage. If spouses insisted
N Id.
" Hanlon v. Hanlon, 8 Ky. Op. 724, 726 (1876).
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upon having consideration pass in return for each interspousal
gift, the trust and harmony which should prevail in a marriage
would be diminished. The spouses' relationship would be more
akin to that of partners in business.
To summarize the Court's view at this early stage, prop-
erty was restored only if it had been conveyed by one spouse
to the other as a result of some "obligation, moral or legal,
growing out of the marriage relation." 102 This holding was based
upon the language of the restoration statute, upon a desire that
property law and contract law be respected, and upon an aim
to promote interspousal and family harmony.
After this construction had been announced, explained,
and applied, the legislature amended the code provision per-
taining to restoration. 103 As the Court stated in 1899, in Irwin
v. Irwin,"4 "[Iln view of the decision in Phillips v. Phillips, the
words 'directly or indirectly' were inserted in section 425 of the
present code, and it was further provided that 'any property so
obtained without valuable consideration shall be deemed to
have been obtained by reason of marriage.' 105
102 Whaley v. Taylor, 9 Ky. Op. 742, 743 (1877).
10 This author was unable to find the specific act that amended § 462 of the
Kentucky Civil Code of Practice, on which the Court had relied in Phillips. Prior to
the amendment, § 462 provided in pertinent part:
In every final judgment for a divorce from the bond of matrimony, an order
shall be made, that each party be restored to all property not disposed of at
the commencement of the action, which either party obtained from or
through the other during the marriage, and in consideration or by reason
thereof.
1867 Kentucky Civil Code of Practice § 462. The Kentucky Court of Appeals indicated
in Irwin v. Irwin, 52 S.W. 927 (Ky. 1899), that the code provision had been amended
in response to Phillips, an 1872 case. Id. at 927-28. See text at note 105 infra for the
Court's statement. The 1876 Code indicated that the section number had been changed
to 425 and that the section had been amended by that time; that is, the valuable
consideration language had been added. Since it had been amended by 1876 and Irwin
indicated that the amendment was a response to Phillips, the amendment must have
been made between 1872 and 1876.
As has been noted (see note 69 supra), this Code provision was a parallel provision
to the statute (403.065) which authorized the "proceedings" for restoration. Since the
amended § 425 required "valuable" consideration, it effectively superseded the stat-
ute. The same could have been said about § 462. See notes to § 462 in 1867 Kentucky
Civil Code of Practice: "So far. . . as [the statute] was designed to regulate the mode
of enforcing the right of restoration of property acquired during marriage, it has been
superseded by sec. 462 of the civil code." Id. at 513.
201 52 S.W. 927 (Ky. 1899).
Id. at 927-28.
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Interpreting the statute in its new form, the Irwin Court
embraced the construction that it had firmly rejected twenty-
seven years earlier in Phillips. The Court held that unless valu-
able consideration had been paid for a conveyance, the exist-
ence of the marriage was enough to invoke restoration. This
construction, which was consistently followed after Irwin, was
grounded solely upon the wording of the restoration statute.
Sich a construction yielded results that clearly conflicted with
those that followed from the Phillips interpretation. Under
Phillips, a stated consideration of one dollar plus the love and
affection of the wife was held sufficient to prevent restoration,
since the conveyance had not been made as a result of the act
of marriage itself.106 In contrast, under the Irwin construction,
the Court held that one husband had not provided enough
separate consideration when he made some repairs and paid
some mortgage payments on land deeded to him and his wife
by the wife's mother."7 Another husband was restored "his"
property even though the wife's father loaned money to the
husband and required that his daughter hold the property in
her name."0 8 Clearly the legislative amendment and subsequent
judicial interpretation of the amendment significantly altered
the idea of restoration upon divorce in Kentucky.
Which is the better interpretation? The wording of the
amended statute militated in favor of the Irwin interpretation.
The Phillips approach, however, was more thoroughly consid-
ered. Phillips was consistent with societal desires for inter-
spousal harmony and with property law and contract law.
Phillips recognized the underpinnings of restoration-the no-
tion that property should be restored only to a divorced woman,
and only then if ownership had been denied her simply because
she was married. The amendment by the Kentucky legislature
and the subsequent decision by the Irwin Court strayed too far
when they extended the notion of restoration beyond property
conveyed "in the discharge of any obligation, moral or legal,
growing out of the marriage relation."'0 0 A thorough analysis of
restoration shows that Phillips, not Irwin, should be "the law."
'" See text accompanying notes 94-100 supra for a discussion of Phillips.
21 Griffith v. Griffith, 458 S.W.2d 449 (Ky. 1970).
' Lyen v. Lyen, 422 S.W.2d 127 (Ky. 1967).
" Whaley v. Taylor, 9 Ky. Op. 742, 743 (1877).
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3. Consideration Under Irwin
The amended Code provision indicated that "valuable"
consideration must exist to avoid restoration of an interspousal
gift; the courts had to decide precisely what constituted
"valuable" consideration in the words of the amendment.
(a) Monetary Consideration Required but Inequities
Redressed Through Alimony
The interpretation of "valuable" led to widespread appli-
cation of the concept of restoration. Generally, the Court con-
sidered only one criterion in defining "valuable": which spouse
had provided funds for, or contributed to the purchase of, the
property.110 Only money constituted valuable consideration.
Property obtained without valuable consideration was ob-
tained "by reason of marriage" and was restored.' This inter-
pretation was fair to both spouses regarding property which
either had brought to the marriage and transferred to the other
spouse. Usually neither spouse paid money, in these transfers
so the property would be restored to the original owner. How-
I'$ See Smith v. Smith, 436 S.W.2d 532 (Ky. 1969); DeSimone v. DeSimone, 388
S.W.2d 591 (Ky. 1965); Taylor v. Taylor, 331 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1960); Wells v. Wells,
293 S.W.2d 718 (Ky. 1956); Waits v. Waits, 277 S.W.2d 5 (Ky. 1955); Hannan v.
Hannan, 256 S.W.2d 485 (Ky. 1953); Eckhoff v. Eckhoff, 247 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1952);
Dixon v. Dixon, 226 S.W.2d 954 (Ky. 1950); Bowman v. Bowman, 221 S.W.2d 72 (Ky.
1949); Hardman v. Hardman, 214 S.W.2d 391 (Ky. 1948); Dunn v. Dunn, 213 S.W.2d
1011 (Ky. 1948); Brown v. Brown, 185 S.W.2d 680 (Ky. 1945); West v. West, 16 S.W.2d
781 (Ky. 1929); Duke v. Duke, 248 S.W. 500 (Ky. 1923); Pruett v. Pruett, 199 S.W.
1073 (Ky. 1918); Bums v. Bums, 190 S.W. 683 (Ky. 1917).
"I The scope of restoration was controlled after the Irwin decision by the Court's
definition of valuable consideration. Even though purely monetary consideration was
lacking, the Court disallowed restoration in two situations: fraudulent conveyances
and divorce-related agreements.
Restoration was disallowed if the conveyance was made for immoral or fraudulent
purposes. Justice v. Justice, 219 S.W.2d 964 (Ky. 1949). If a conveyance was made to
a spouse in order to defraud creditors and thereby avoid liability, restoration was
disallowed. Stewart v. Stewart, 302 S.W.2d 95 (Ky. 1957); Jagoe v. Jagoe, 238 S.W.
185 (Ky. 1921); Honaker v. Honaker, 206 S.W. 12 (Ky. 1918); Bean v. Bean, 176 S.W.
181 (Ky. 1915); Coleman v. Coleman, 144 S.W. 1 (Ky. 1912); Lankford v. Lankford,
117 S.W. 962 (Ky. 1909). Similarly, separate consideration has been held to exist if
one spouse conveyed property to the other as alimony or in agreement in contemplation
of separation or divorce. "[H]ere she did not get the property in consideration of, or
by reason, of, her intermarriage with him, but because they could not live in the proper
conjugal relations, and were severing the same." Flood v. Flood, 68 Ky. (5 Bush) 167,
170 (1869).
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ever, this interpretation worked substantially to the detriment
of women regarding property acquired during marriage. For the
most part, women did not contribute money for the purchase
of marital property, even jointly held property. Thus, most of
the marital property "obtained" by women was obtained with-
out valuable consideration and was restored to the husband.112
The character of the title113 or non-economic contributions 1 4
were apparently irrelevant. Only when a financial contribution
could be clearly proven was a divorced spouse given any inter-
est in property."5 If no such proof existed,"8 or if the evidence
was "vague and uncertain,""' 7 then restoration would be al-
lowed for failure of proof of consideration.
Such "services" as "keeping boarders; taking in washing;
selling milk; taking care of the mine p5onies; and doing all the
gardening and farming" were insufficient consideration to pre-
vent restoration."8 The Court explicitly admitted its refusal to
recognize the contributions made by a homemaker's services as
well as its method of atoning for this wrong:
That a wife who makes the home, raises the children, gives
succor and moral support to the husband and aids him in the
saving and investment of his money, but who does not di-
rectly convert any individual effort or earnings into the form
of property, in the event of divorce has no interest in the
property accumulated through the husband's earnings during
the marriage is a travesty made tolerable only by the judicial
power to correct it in the form of alimony."'
,,M A woman could obtain property in this situation if her husband purchased a
home and put it in his and his wife's names. If his wife was a homemaker, then she
would have not contributed valuable consideration and the property would be restored
to the husband. See note 132 infra for a further discussion of this point.
,,3 Hardman v. Hardman, 214 S.W.2d 391 (Ky. 1948); Pruett v. Pruett, 199 S.W.
1073 (Ky. 1918).
11 See, e.g., Roberts v. Roberts, 268 S.W.2d 423 (Ky. 1954); Johnson v. Johnson,
255 S.W.2d 610 (Ky. 1953); Maynard v. Maynard, 224 S.W.2d 158 (Ky. 1949); Fifer v.
Fifer, 205 S.W.2d 479 (Ky. 1947); Woford v. Woford, 103 S.W.2d 296 (Ky. 1937).
,HI Cook v. Cook, 373 S.W.2d 432 (Ky. 1963); Wolfinbarger v. Wolfinbarger, 342
S.W.2d 699 (Ky. 1961).
,"' Damron v. Damron, 415 S.W.2d 836 (Ky. 1967); Rayborn v. Raybom, 329
S.W.2d 576 (Ky. 1959).
,, Pruett v. Pruett, 199 S.W. 1073, 1073-74 (Ky. 1918).
,, Roberts v. Roberts, 268 S.W.2d 423, 423 (Ky. 1954).
"' Heustis v. Heustis, 346 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Ky. 1961).
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Such compensation in the form of alimony was the Court's self-
proclaimed "usual practice." '
For true consideration to exist in the form of such services,
said the Court in 1909, "the conveyance must be made in pay-
ment for the services or in pursuance of a contract, agreement,
or understanding by which the services were to be compensated
for in that manner." 2 ' Only in such a situation would property
be held to be non-restorable, and only rarely did such a situa-
tion occur.'22 In those infrequent cases where property was di-
vided fairly equally between the spouses on divorce, the Court
was quick to point out that it was departing from its "usual
practice" for a particular reason: The services may not have
been totally domestic services,' 2 for example, or the spouses
themselves may have treated the property as being jointly
held.124
The result of the Irwin approach may not have been much
different from the Phillips approach with regard to property
acquired during the marriage and held in the husband's name.
Under Phillips, if the husband held property for which he had
contributed the purchase price, no question of restoration
would even arise, since a conveyance had not been made to the
wife, and it is doubtful that her non-economic services gave her
an interest in property held in her husband's name. Regarding
jointly held property, however, Irwin had a pernicious effect.
Since the married women's property laws were expanding to
give married women the right to own property,'12 it is possible
that the amended Code provision and Irwin were reactions to
this right. If a married woman could own property, the Phillips
approach could prevent restoration of jointly held property to
the husband, even if he had purchased the property, under one
of three theories: 1) the wife owned the property and, since
restoration was permitted only if the property was obtained by
'2 Pleasnick v. Pleasnick, 284 S.W. 1070, 1071 (Ky. 1926). It is interesting that
the Court's "usual practice" was not followed in Pleasnick because the husband was
an habitual drunkard. As a result, the wife retained title to the contested property.
2I Dunker v. Schuff, 119 S.W. 742, 743 (Ky. 1909).
'2See, e.g., Noonan v. Noonan, 268 S.W. 552 (Ky. 1925).
"I Patterson v. Patterson, 266 S.W.2d 91 (Ky. 1954); Powers v. Powers, 211
S.W.2d 687 (Ky. 1948).
,21 Tutt v. Tutt, 200 S.W.2d 924 (Ky. 1947).
121 See note 60 supra for a discussion of these laws in Kentucky.
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"operation of the laws"'' 6 of marriage, she would keep the prop-
erty because it was not obtained by "operation of the laws" of
marriage, or 2) the wife's non-economic contributions were a
sufficient consideration for the property and thus the property
was a valid contractual conveyance,' 27 or 3) a valid gift had
been made. 128 By requiring valuable consideration to prevent
restoration, the Irwin Court effectively destroyed a
homemaker-wife's right to own property. Since the husband
usually purchased marital property and the wife contributed
non-economic services, a wife would rarely be able to keep
property acquired during marriage. The detrimental effect of
this holding carried over into compelling situations in which
the husband held all property acquired during marriage in his
own name. Even if a court wanted to call-such property
"marital property" and divide it between the parties, a
homemaker-wife who had not furnished valuable consideration
could never have a share of marital property. If the court
wanted to divide the property in a "just" or "fair" manner,
they were unable to do do without resorting to the use of ali-
mony.129
(b) Colley: Some Misinterpretations Corrected
In 1970, the Court in Colley v. Colley'3' corrected two mis-
understandings related to restoration of property. First, the
Court held that property acquired as a result of the spouses'
joint efforts, that is, team-effort property, is not restorable. In
addition, alimony was explicitly extricated from the concept of
property division.
Time after time, prior to Colley, one spouse or the other
"' See text accompanying note 95 supra for this language in Phillips.
The logic of Phillips would make this rationale unnecessary: Restoration only
existed to right the wrong that existed before the married women's property laws and
property not received "by operation of law" would not be restored. Finding a valid
contract, however, could be an alternative theory, much as the one dollar consideration
in Phillips indicated a contract. See text accompanying note 99 supra.
"2 Again, this alternative would not logically be necessary under Phillips, see note
127 supra, but it is an alternative basis for the holding. See text accompanying note
99 supra.
I" See text accompanying notes 119-20 supra for a discussion of the use of alimony
in this fashion.
1- 460 S.W.2d 821 (Ky. 1970).
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had been restored certain property regardless of whether that
property was team-effort property."' This was consistent with
the Court's insistence upon monetary consideration. 32 How-
ever, in 1969 in Cooke v. Cooke, 13 the Court pointed out some
inadequacies in its previous restoration cases:
[T]he orthodox procedure where the husband has furnished
the initial capital investment is to restore the property to him
and compensate the wife through alimony secured by a lien.
But this is merely subterfuge. Alimony and an equitable in-
terest in property are not the same. They have come to be
brewed in the same pot only because of another fallacy, which
is that the property in question must be said to belong to one
party or the other, when the truth of the matter is that it
belongs to both, and if it had not been for the efforts of both
it would have belonged to neither.
We see no justifiable reason why the 'happen-stance' of
which party had the cash to put up the original down pay-
ment, however small it may have been as compared with the
present net value of the property, should be the immutable
criterion of 'ownership.2 34
Subsequently the Court reaffirmed this view in Colley, holding:
"Where property is acquired during marriage by the joint ef-
forts of the parties, it should be divided between the spouses
according to what is just and reasonable.'' Under no circum-
,", See, e.g., Sexton v. Sexton, 433 S.W.2d 133 (Ky. 1968); Anderson v. Anderson,
392 S.W.2d 45 (Ky. 1965); Willoughby v. Willoughby, 294 S.W.2d 550 (Ky. 1956);
Millar v. Millar, 286 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1956); Stratton v. Stratton, 211 S.W.2d 685 (Ky.
1948).
3I Although the notions of "restoration" and "team-effort property" may appear
to be totally inconsistent with each other, it must be remembered that much property
that was declared team-effort property after Colley was acquired through intangible
services, which the Court had previously held were not valuable consideration. Thus,
prior to Colley, such property was not team-effort property at all.
An example may clarify exactly where lies the gift (a prerequisite for restoration)
in such situations. If a purchaser-husband put the title to the marital home in his and
his homemaker wife's names, then prior to Colley he would be said to have given one-
half of the residence to his wife and he could be restored to that property. Since Colley,
of course, the intangible services which the wife-as-homemaker had contributed would
be considered, and the property would be adjudged to be team-effort property and thus
not restorable. No "gift" would exist after the Colley decision.
2 449 S.W.2d 216 (Ky. 1969).
, Id. at 217.
23 460 S.W.2d at 826.
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stances, said the Court, should team-effort property be restora-
ble.
The notion that team-effort property is not restorable has
been reiterated in several post-Colley cases.13 Several cases in
which judgment had been rendered prior to Colley were re-
manded by the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of
the principles which were announced in Colley. 137 It seems safe
to say that Colley and its offspring have forever banished resto-
ration from the realm of joint-effort property.138
The Court implicitly declared that non-economic services
are valuable consideration by holding that team-effort property
is not restorable. By holding that non-economic contributions
are valuable consideration, the Court removed any further
need to use alimony as a method of compensating impecunious
but industrious wives.130 Accordingly, Colley and its progeny
emphasized that a "distinction [must be made] between
property awarded to the wife as a division of property accumu-
lated during the marriage and property awarded to her as ali-
mony.""' Although in the early twentieth century alimony and
restoration were neatly separated,4 subsequent cases fre-
IN See, e.g., Straney v. Straney, 481 S.W.2d 292 (Ky. 1972); Petersen v. Petersen,
479 S.W.2d 892 (Ky. 1972); Dahlenburg v. Dahlenburg, 479 S.W.2d 606 (Ky. 1972);
Moore v. Moore, 477 S.W.2d 792 (Ky. 1972); Roberts v. Roberts, 462 S.W.2d 911 (Ky.
1971).
lu See, e.g., Bentley v. Bentley, 500 S.W.2d 411 (Ky. 1973); Williams v. Williams,
500 S.W.2d 79 (Ky. 1973); Dowell v. Dowell, 490 S.W.2d 478 (Ky. 1973); Goffv. Goff,
481 S.W.2d 80 (Ky. 1972); Rigsby v. Rigsby, 481 S.W.2d 657 (Ky. 1972); Coleman v.
Coleman, 479 S.W.2d 602 (Ky. 1971); Thomas v. Thomas, 464 S.W.2d 257 (Ky. 1971).
13 This arm of Colley was a reflection of current societal standards reflecting the
changed position of women. Spouses have become more equally responsible for their
financial well-being, and wholesale reversals of traditional sex-roles are no longer unu-
sual. Disallowing further use of the outmoded rules which had previously governed
restoration of team-effort property rids the law of fictions which were exposed by the
Court in Cooke. See text at note 122 supra. Further, Colley encourages the notion of
family harmony, as did Phillips in 1872. If marital harmony is to be encouraged, the
courts should not urge the spouses to keep hard proof of their cash contributions to
the marital property, and marriage partners should in fact be encouraged to donate
non-economic services to the relationship. Colley admirably mirrored the practices and
beliefs of today's marital partners and of modern society.
" See text accompanying notes 119-20 supra for a discussion of the Court's usual
practice.
"I Petersen v. Petersen, 479 S.W.2d 892, 894 (Ky. 1972). See also Roberts v.
Roberts, 462 S.W.2d 911 (Ky. 1971).
1' See, e.g., Duvall v. Duvall, 144 S.W. 78 (Ky. 1912).
1978-791
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67
quently jumbled the two concepts. 42 Both the Kentucky Court
of Appeals' and commentators"' had urged a division between
the two prior to Colley. None of these early rumblings, how-
ever, influenced divorce law in Kentucky as did Colley. The
Court in Colley established an analysis for the purposes of di-
viding property and awarding alimony in divorce cases."' This
process was later codified by the legislature4 ' as part of the new
Kentucky divorce law. Clearly Colley significantly redefined
the contours of restoration.1 47
D. The Proper Scope of Restoration
Colley went a long way toward removing the concept of
restoration from Kentucky divorce law. However, a further step
needs to be made. It should be clear that this author considers
the legislative and judicial responses to Phillips to be misinter-
"I See Cox v. Cox, 343 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1961); Williams v. Williams, 338 S.W.2d
689 (Ky. 1960); Rogers v. Rogers, 295 S.W.2d 302 (Ky. 1956).
"1 See Baker v. Baker, 344 S.W.2d 391 (Ky. 1961); Arnold v. Arnold's Ex'x, 237
S.W.2d 58 (Ky. 1951).
"I Recent Cases, Domestic Relations-Restoration of Property Versus Lump Sum
Alimony, 47 Ky. L.J. 573 (1959).
'0 The "Colley process" works as follows:
The first step is a division of the property acquired by the team effort, then
the separate question of permanent alimony must be faced. At that point,
the approach changes. Fault becomes a factor. Is the wife entitled to a
divorce? If she is not, then she is not entitled to permanent alimony ....
The next necessary determination is, even though she is entitled to a divorce,
does she have 'sufficient estate of her own'?
460 S.W.2d at 827.
14, KRS §§ 403.190-.200 (Supp. 1978).
,47 Why did Colley provide the impetus which earlier pleas had failed to provide?
Part of the reason was the surge away from notions of fault in divorce. Kentucky
alimony statutes had always considered fault as a factor in deciding whether to award
alimony. See 460 SW.2d at 826. It was a natural result, then, that if alimony was
confused with property division, which includes the concept of restoration, fault would
further confuse the issue. See, e.g., Eckhoff v. Eckhoff, 247 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1952). The
trend toward no-fault divorce made courts place fault and its companion concepts in
their proper places to prevent fault from once again becoming the rule in divorce cases.
Alimony and fault are still related notions in Kentucky divorce law; the court in Colley,
however, was careful to keep "fault" from bleeding over into areas other than alimony.
Another reason that Colley greatly influenced Kentucky divorce law was that it
reflected a growing awareness of society that regardless of which spouse pays the
purchase price, property in a marriage is usually acquired as a result of a team effort.
Intangible services contribute as much toward the accumulation of team-effort prop-
erty as do tangible contributions.
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pretations of the concept of restoration. Colley, which removed
team-effort property from the reach of restoration, has greatly
minimized the effect of the Irwin interpretation. A review of the
original purposes and modern justifications for restoration
leads to the conclusion that restoration currently has no viable
role to play in the division of property upon divorce.
An appraisal of the appropriate modern orbit of restoration
must begin with a determination of whether the original pur-
pose of restoration is now a legitimate concern. As detailed
above, restoration was necessitated by property law which
made a husband the absolute owner of his wife's property.4 8
When the married women's property acts discarded those old
notions, the attendant concept of restoration should have been
discarded as well. Indeed, had the Kentucky Supreme Court
followed Phillips,'49 the notion of restoration would have per-
ished upon adoption of these laws in Kentucky, since the
Phillips Court held that property was restorable only if it had
been conveyed as a result of the act of marriage. 5 '
Even though the original purpose of restoration is no
longer a societal concern, a new basis for this concept could
have evolved. The legislative response to Phillips and the
Court's construction of the amended Code provision in Irwin" '
extended restoration to property conveyed at any time during
the marriage without valuable consideration.' 2 Language in
post-Irwin cases suggests that the Kentucky Supreme Court
saw a modern justification for subjecting all interspousal gifts
' See notes 60-62 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the disabilities
of married women and their need for restoration.
"1' 72 Ky. (9 Bush) 183 (1872). See notes 94-100 supra and accompanying text for
a discussion of Phillips.
I" Under Phillips, a validly executed marriage contract which conveyed property
from one spouse to the other in consideration of the act of marriage might be invalida-
ted and the property "restored" upon divorce of those two persons. However, the
restoration in this context would be a result of failure of consideration of the contract,
not a result of the restoration statute. Restoration would no longer be necessary for
property conveyed "by operation of law" since no property would be so conveyed.
I' 52 S.W. 927 (Ky. 1899). See notes 104-09 supra and accompanying text for a
discussion of Irwin.
M The disastrous consequences of this overextension of restoration should not be
overlooked. Restoration came to be wrongly applied to team-effort property and to be
entwined with alimony. Not until 71 years later, in Colley, did the Court finally begin
to rectify the results of Irwin.
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to restoration upon divorce. The idea of restoration, announced
the Court, "is based solely upon the fact that one spouse has
invested earnings or money, or something else of a valuable
consideration, in the property the other spouse owns at the
time of the divorce.' ' 53 The Court apparently perceived an un-
fairness in allowing retained ownership of property when the
owner had not given consideration for the property. This view
of unfairness was broader than the unfairness that operated on
married women prior to the adoption of the married women's
property acts. Restoration in that situation prevented an ex-
husband from keeping property his ex-wife had been forced to
"convey" to him. The view of unfairness expressed above ex-
tended to all conveyances, voluntary ones as well as those
forced by operation of law. Unfairness is a tenuous argument
for restoration when voluntary conveyances, as well as manda-
tory ones, are encompassed. In forced conveyances, even if
some wives would have chosen to give their own property to
their husbands, the fact remains that they had no such choice.
Under modern law, in contrast, this choice is possible. The
element of "intent" can exist just as with any other gift. Be-
cause of this freedom of choice, unfairness should not be used
as a modem basis to restore all interspousal gifts.'54
Another possible modern justification for restoration has
been explicitly stated by the Court in two cases:
It was the intent of the enactors of the statutes that the
property of one party to a marriage obtained by the other
party without valuable consideration other than by reason of
the marriage should be given back to the original party upon
the dissolution of the marriage. It was intended that each
party should be returned as nearly as possible to the status
or condition in which the party would have been except for
the marriage.' 55
[T]he restoration of property statute was simply designed
and expressed to require that each spouse return gifts that
Pearson v. Pearson, 350 S.W.2d 141, 143 (Ky. 1961).
" Unfairness which amounts to fraud or undue influence will prompt
"restoration," that is, invalidation of the gift, under traditional property law. See notes
14-30 supra and accompanying text. See also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 18 (Smith-Hurd
1976) and cases annotated therein.
"I Kivett v. Kivett, 312 S.W.2d 884, 888 (Ky. 1958).
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were received from the other spouse or his family during mar-
riage.15
These statements reflect a view that all interspousal gifts made
during marriage are conditional, and that when the condition
for the gift-the marriage-ceases to exist, the gift should
be returned to the donor. 57 By returning the gift to the donor,
the parties are to be restored to the status in which they
existed but for the marriage. Such conditional gifts and a
desire for the status quo are poor rationales for restoration.
Spouses who have contributed tangible gifts during a mar-
riage can easily be restored to their former positions under this
theory. Those whose contributions were intangible, however,
are not so readily protected, since their contributions cannot
be returned nor, in many cases, can their worth be measured.'58
Thus the same question recurs which faced the Phillips Court:
Are spouses to be encouraged to transform their marriage into
a business traisaction by keeping scrupulous records on intan-
gible services which each contributes, in order to guarantee
equitable restoration in the event of a divorce? If restoration is
based on a conditional gift theory, then such record-keeping
will be necessary to protect a spouse who contributes intangible
services. Such an undesirable result prevents the use of the
conditional gift idea and should inhibit the desire to return the
parties to the status quo through restoration.
Besides unfairness and the conditional gift doctrine, no
current motivation for restoration appears to exist in Ken-
tucky. Since its original justification has vanished and has not
been supplanted by a new one, restoration should no longer
complicate property division in divorce cases.
' Colley v. Colley, 460 S.W.2d 821, 825 (Ky. 1970).
"' The "conditional gift" theory has also been applied to gifts made in contempla-
tion of marriage. If the marriage does not occur, the engagement gift can be recovered.
See, e.g., Note, Gifts: Recovery of Engagement Gifts: California Civil Code Section
1590, 38 CAL. L. REv. 529 (1950); Note, Recovery of Engagement Gifts and the Heart
Balm Acts, 3 Wyo. L.J. 147 (1949); Recent Decisions, 1 BAYLOR L. REv. 485 (1949).
In If the Kentucky courts were basing restoration upon a conditional gift theory,
they were not necessarily being insensitive to the spouse who had contributed intangi-
ble services. Since the conditional gift theory is entirely consistent with the Court's
refusal to allow intangible services to be sufficient consideration to ward off restora-
tion, the Court may have seen such services as being relatively inconsequential. It is
understandable that they would not have perceived any disadvantage built into the
conditional gift theory.
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E. Restoration in Other Jurisdictions
Based on an examination of other states' statutes, Ken-
tucky may be virtually alone if the Kentucky Court construes
modern divorce law to retain the concept of restoration.'5 9
Michigan currently allows restoration of "the real and personal
estate that shall have come to either party by reason of the
marriage." ' Two other states, Arkansas and West Virginia,"8 '
also allow restoration to either spouse. Neither of these states'
statutes, however, parallels the Irwin view. West Virginia does
not condition restoration upon transfers made because of a
marriage. Its statute reads: "[Upon decreeing a divorce, the
court shall have power to award to either of the parties what-
ever of his or her property, real or personal, may be in the
possession, .or under the control, or in the name, of the other
. . "62 Arkansas, which adopted its restoration law from the
1850 Kentucky statute,' follows Phillips, not Irwin."4 An ex-
amination of all state divorce statutes reveals that only Michi-
"I The examination of all state divorce laws was limited to the states' statutes;
the author recognizes that case law may significantly alter the literal reading of any
particular statute, as, indeed, Kentucky's own statute does not mention "restoration".
See notes 38-58 and accompanying text supra. Significantly, however, this examina-
tion revealed that no other state handles property division upon divorce with a restora-
tion statute similar to the one repealed in Kentucky in 1972. See note 39 and accompa-
nying text supra for the history of Kentucky's restoration statute.
"' MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 552.19 (Supp. 1978).
SI ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214 (1962); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-21 (1976).
,z W. VA. CODE § 48-2-21 (1976).
' McNutt v. McNutt, 95 S.W. 778 (Ark. 1906). Oklahoma's restoration law, now
repealed, was also adopted from the Kentucky statute. See Thomas v. Thomas, 109
P. 825 (Okla. 1910).
"I Phillips v. Phillips, 365 S.W.2d 261 (Ark. 1963). Although it adopted the prefer-
able interpretation of restoration, the Arkansas court's use of restoration was more
expansive than necessary. As detailed earlier, if restoration were applied coextensively
with its roots, it would not be practiced today. In Arkansas, however, restoration
survives even now. In holding that property had not been conveyed in consideration
of the act of marriage, the Arkansas court stated: "In fact, there is no substantial
evidence that the property was ever mentioned or considered by the parties before the
marriage, nor was [the husband's] claimed interest in the property created by reason
of the operation of law." Id. at 263. Thus the court interpreted "in consideration of
marriage" to encompass conveyances made either by agreement of the parties or by
operation of law. The former should be covered by the traditional law of property or
contracts. As for the latter, those conveyances which are made by operation of law
upon marriage (e.g., dower) should also be revoked by operation of law upon divorce.
Even the Arkansas construction of "in consideration of marriage," then, will not suffer
if restoration disappears.
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gan's, on its face, espouses restoration as conceived by Irwin.65
Of the remaining forty-six states, only New Hampshire has
a true restoration statute. Under that law, property is restora-
ble only to a wife: "Upon a decree of nullity or divorce, the
court may restore to the wife all or any part of her estate, and
may assign to her such part of the estate of her husband, or
order him to pay such sum of money, as may be deemed just
S... ."' This view, of course, is consistent with the origins of
restoration. 6 '
Forty-five states and the District of Columbia control the
disposition of property in divorce cases without the use of a
restoration statute. ' The statutes in those jurisdictions often
require a "just" division of property.'69 Some state laws also
give guidelines regarding factors which should be considered.'70
,1 Despite its obvious similarity to Kentucky's former restoration statute, whether
the Michigan law shares the Irwin view is debatable. Rather, it may merely signify an
elimination of sexual discrimination, since, prior to a 1970 amendment, the Michigan
statute permitted restoration only.to wives. Thus Kentucky may truly stand alone in
its interpretation of restoration.
" N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 458:19 (1968).
,, Other states have also recognized that the term "restoration" properly applies
only to wives. See notes 60-68 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the
original justification for restoration. Some now-repealed state laws restored property
only to wives. See, e.g., MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 552.19 (1967) (repealed 1970); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 158.56 (West 1969) (repealed 1969). See also Phillips v. Culliton, 26 N.E.
137 (Mass. 1891) (referring to the old Massachusetts law). While not specifically order-
ing or allowing restoration, Tennessee law also appears to represent the view that
restoration does not apply to husbands:
[Tihe court may decree to the wife such part of the husband's real and
personal estate as it may think proper. In doing so, the court may have
reference and look to the property which the husband received by his wife
at the time of the marriage, or afterwards, as well as to the separate property
secured to her by marriage contract or otherwise.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-821 (1977). Clearly several jurisdictions recognize the authentic
beginnings of restoration.
lu Those jurisdictions which formerly had restoration statutes often applied them
tentatively, as if uncertain of their true function. See, e.g., Recent cases, Restoration
of Property to Husband Which Wife Has Acquired Through Him, 5 MnN. L. Rav. 558
(1921) (discussing the old Minnesota and Wisconsin laws, and noting that restoration
decisions cite Kentucky cases as authority).
"I See, e.g., KAN. STAT. § 60-1610 (1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.58 (West Supp.
1977).
"I See, e.g., Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 307, 9 U.L.A. 371-72 (West
Supp. 1978). States which have enacted this uniform law are listed at 9 U.L.A. 360
(West Supp. 1978). Kentucky's new divorce law represents its adoption of this uniform
act. "Restoration" is not mentioned in the uniform law.
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"Restoration" as used in most state divorce laws simply refers
to a woman's resumption of her maiden name after divorce.17,
By a formidable margin, Kentucky seems to represent a minor-
ity holdout for restoration. 172
CONCLUSION
Under current Kentucky divorce law, gifts are not as-
sumed to be marital property. Rather, they are presumed to be
individual property of the owner-spouse. Because interspousal
gifts have been upheld as valid for many years, those gifts
should be contained within the marital property exception, if
they are legitimately "gifts" under property law.
A larger question looms, however, beyond the question of
validity. The concept of restoration of property has been used
by courts to divest a divorced spouse of valid interspousal
gifts. 173 This second issue, then, is whether restoration of prop-
erty survives in modern divorce law.
Restoration - the idea that a spouse should be placed in
a position as near as possible to the position which would be
held but for the marriage - pervaded the area of property
division with free rein until only a few years ago. In Colley v.
Colley, 17 the Kentucky Court of Appeals revealed two misap-
plications of the concept. Restoration was held not to apply to
team-effort property. Further, restoration had been mistakenly
entertwined with alimony and its partner, fault. Because
Colley eliminated restoration from the significant area of team-
effort property, the impact of a total rejection of restoration
was lessened. By unmasking restoration to this extent, the
Court opened the doors for a complete upheaval of the notion
of restoration.
The time for this penetrating re-examination of restoration
"' See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3105.16 (Anderson 1972); S.D. COMPLIED LAWS
ANN. § 25-4-47 (1976).
11 Twenty-five years ago, Kentucky was politely termed "a pioneer state in this
type of legislation." Case Note, Domestic Relations-Restoration of Property Obtained
in Consideration or by Reason of Marriage upon Divorce, 7 ARK. L. REV. 64 (1952-53).
This brief summary of restoration laws, the only one found by the author, is now
outdated.
"' See note 3 supra for cases in which valid gifts have been restored.
17 460 S.W.2d 821 (Ky. 1970).
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is now. Although current Kentucky divorce law fails to mention
the word "restoration," the Supreme Court has implied that
the concept is inherent in the present statutes by deciding Ping
v. Denton'1 5 and Kidwell v. Mason17 narrowly on their facts. If
Kentucky courts continue to restore property in divorce cases,
they will represent an extreme minority position. Kentucky
should join the jurisdictions which have wisely excised the idea
of restoration from modern divorce cases.
Such a result is justifiable because the purpose which un-
derlay restoration no longer exists: It is an archaic remnant of
former laws. Restoration found its roots in the outmoded prop-
erty laws which gave to a husband, upon marriage, all owner-
ship rights in his wife's separate property. Further, no addi-
tional modern basis for restoring interspousal gifts can be
found.
In addition to the absence of any reasons for applying res-
toration, the objectionable consequences of restoration man-
date against its current vitality. At least three values compete
with restoration when a court considers divorce: a desire not to
disturb gifts that are valid under the law of property; an inter-
est in preserving conveyances for which consideration has
passed (making them valid under contract law); and a convic-
tion that harmony should be encouraged during the dissolution
situation. These aims - family harmony and a deference to
contract law and property law - were soundly represented in
1872 by Phillips v. Phillips.177 That case held that property was
restorable only if it had been conveyed in consideration of the
marriage itself. Besides keeping intact all of the values which
have been considered, Phillips would have made restoration
coterminous with those laws which gave a wife's property to her
husband at marriage. On all fronts, then, the interpretation
was sound.
The entire meaning of restoration was later altered by the
legislature and subsequently by the judiciary in response to
Phillips. An amended Code provision, coupled with the deci-
sion in Irwin v. Irwin,178 extended the concept of restoration far
"' 562 S.W.2d 314 (Ky. 1978).
U, 564 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1978).
72 Ky. (9 Bush) 183 (1872).
52 S.W. 927 (Ky. 1899).
1978-79]
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outside its intended boundaries. The Irwin construction of res-
toration was grounded only upon the language of the new provi-
sion; neither contract law, property law, nor marital peace was
ever mentioned. Because the legislative and judicial reactions
to Phillips were ill-considered, the Kentucky Supreme Court
should reject the view stated in Irwin in 1899 and implicitly
sanctioned again in Ping v. Denton'79 and Kidwell v. Mason.'8"
Restoration of property was properly interpreted in Phillips,
and that concept should have died with the enactment of the
married women's property laws.
By an ironic twist, restoration was initially aimed at pro-
tecting women but was ultimately used to their disadvantage.
Before Colley, the Court refused to recognize the intangible
services of a homemaker as valuable consideration. As a result,
a divorced homemaker often lost her "share" of team-effort
property to her husband who had supplied the monetary con-
sideration. No suggestion has been found that the Court's con-
tinued use of restoration was deliberate discrimination against
women, however. Rather, the Court was apparently never
really aware of the beginnings of restoration, since no thorough
examination into the concept has ever been mentioned in Ken-
tucky cases. This factor, coupled with the Court's long-
standing utilization of restoration, seems to have been the
major reason for the continued application of the practice.
Regardless of the reason for its continued use, the out-
moded notion of restoration should no longer be allowed to
confuse the issue of whether a valid interspousal gift falls
within the marital property presumption. Because restoration
of property is an aberration in current Kentucky divorce law,
it should no longer be used to rescind otherwise valid inter-
spousal gifts. Healthy respect for the values which were pre-
served by the Court of Appeals in Phillips requires that the
validity of such gifts should be the only question which courts
consider. No reason remains for interspousal gifts to be outside
the gift exception to marital property. The donee should be
allowed to keep an interspousal gift if the conditions for a valid
gift - donative intent, delivery, and acceptance - are met. No
"' 562 S.W.2d 314 (Ky. 1978).
"" 564 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1978).
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completed gift, regardless of the identities of donor and donee,
should be presumed to be marital property.
While it is clear that the Supreme Court of Kentucky be-
lieves that the new statute which replaced the restoration stat-
utes has a different effect from that of its predecessors, just
what that effect is remains a clouded issue." ' The resolution of
the unanswered questions in Ping v. Denton ' and Kidwell v.
Mason'83 must await the time when the Supreme Court is faced
with a true interspousal gift divorce case - a divorce case in
which one spouse's separate property has been given to the
other spouse during the marriage without "valuable" consider-
ation. Hopefully, the Court will then review the history of res-
toration and the policy considerations which militate against
continued use of the concept.
Jennifer Burcham Coffman
I Further clouding that issue is the fact that the Kentucky Court of Appeals
continues to use the word "restore" in assigning property in divorce cases. See, e.g.,
Robinson v. Robinson, 569 S.W.2d 178 (Ky. App. 1978).
" 562 S.W.2d 314 (Ky. 1978).
' 564 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1978).
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